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Employee Screening: Theory and Evidence 
Fali Huang∗ 
Peter Cappelli∗∗ 
 
ABSTRACT 
Arguably the fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from 
employees.  Most models suggest that employers meet this challenge by monitoring 
employees carefully to prevent shirking. But there is another option that relies on 
heterogeneity across employees, and that is to screen job candidates to find workers with a 
stronger work ethic who require less monitoring.  This should be especially useful in work 
systems where monitoring by supervisors is more difficult, such as teamwork systems. We 
analyze the relationship between screening and monitoring in the context of a 
principal-agent model and test the theoretical results using a national sample of U.S. 
establishments, which includes information on employee selection. We find that 
employers screen applicants more intensively for work ethic where they make greater use 
of systems such as teamwork where monitoring is more difficult.  This screening is also 
associated with higher productivity and higher wages and benefits, as predicted by the 
theory: The synergies between reduced monitoring costs and high performance work 
systems enable the firm to pay higher wages to attract and retain such workers. Screening 
for other attributes, such as cognitive ability, does not produce these results. 
 
1. Introduction 
Principal-agent models have been central to much of the work in economics, and they have 
been especially useful in understanding employment relationships. A considerable amount 
of research has been directed at understanding and addressing the inherent moral hazard 
problem associated with employment in principal-agent frameworks -- the incentives for 
individual employees to pursue their own interests at the expense of those of their 
employer. Virtually all that research focuses on economic governance schemes that 
provide incentives to induce employees to act in the interests of their employers (See, e.g., 
Gibbons 1998 and Prendergast 1999). These models begin with the definition of 
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appropriate performance, include monitoring to measure performance, and conclude with 
economic rewards -- in some cases punishments -- to motivate employees. These 
agency-based models have been most extensively used in the context of executive 
employment where the agents have considerable control over their performance and where 
the effects of their performance can be readily observed, albeit at the firm-level. It may be 
fair to say that agency models have been used somewhat less for understanding production 
or hourly employment where job performance may be less within the control of the 
individual (e.g., more paced by machines or supervisors) and where individual 
performance may be more difficult to measure. Models that are directed especially at 
hourly workers include efficiency wage approaches and others that rely on punishment 
(e.g., the loss of premiums). They also require monitoring, however, and many have a 
strong agency feel to them. 
There is a second way to address the moral hazard problems associated with 
principal-agent frameworks in employment, however. That approach relies on 
heterogeneity across employees in their abilities, specifically their interest in working hard, 
that is sometimes included under the heading of “unobserved human capital.” Under this 
view, some job applicants are simply better workers than others. Specifically, they may be 
willing to work harder for the same rates of pay and/or are less inclined to shirk their 
responsibilities, requiring less monitoring and supervision as a result. The complication for 
the firm is first that while the applicants know their own capabilities, it is difficult for the 
employer, short of hiring them, to tell. Hence the unobserved problem.  Second, applicants 
who are not hard workers may have an incentive to pretend that they are, especially if 
regimes of low monitoring make it easier for them to shirk and if the jobs pay premiums of 
the kind that might be associated with having better workers. 
The models used to provide solutions to moral hazard problems from this 
perspective often rely on self-selection: Potential applicants typically sort themselves out 
across opportunities such that those who lack the unobserved human capital associated 
with hard work do not apply for jobs that will require it while those that have it do. The 
complication with extending these models more broadly is that they require reasonably 
unique and sometimes complicated reward structures to create the separating equilibrium 
that attracts hard workers and scares away lazy ones, such as piece rate systems or 
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back-loaded compensation where workers have to demonstrate their performance in 
advance of the reward.     
An alternative approach to self-selection is screening. Rather than requiring 
applicants to sort themselves out, the employer attempts to use proxies or other clues to 
identify which applicants have unobserved human capital in the form of a strong work 
ethic. The screening approach is easily applied to a wide range of unobserved human 
capital beyond work ethic and does not require that the applicant even be aware of their 
relevant attributes (e.g., first-time applicants have no relevant experience with which to 
ascertain all of their unobserved human capital). 
In practice, virtually all employers use some level of applicant screening. It is a 
fundamental part of the human resources function in most firms as well as the basis of a 
substantial consulting industry. Further, screening and other forms of addressing the moral 
hazard problem are not mutually exclusive, and most employers make use of both 
screening and post-employment economic incentives (see for example Ichinowski et al. 
1997, Morduch 1999, and Nagin et al 2002).  Among popular screening practices are 
interviews, reference letters, obtaining the agent's past histories through credit bureaus or 
hiring detectives, written tests to uncover work attitudes and personality type, etc. (see 
Rynes and Cable 2003 for a review). Employers differ substantially in the extent to which 
they make use of applicant screening, however (see Wilk and Cappelli 2003), an issue that 
merits explaining.  
Work Ethic and Employment Practices. Although different kinds of jobs may 
require different attributes, arguably the most fundamental attribute and the one that cuts 
across virtually all jobs can be described as work ethic, what we might think of as the 
ability to work hard independent of monitoring by employers or of reward. The seminal 
discussion of work ethic related it to social norms – the “Protestant Ethic” (see Weber 2002) 
- but in the context of understanding variations across individuals, it is more appropriate to 
think about factors that are intrinsic to an individual. The field of industrial/organizational 
psychology is devoted in large measure to understanding work-related differences across 
individuals, and there is extensive research there on the attributes of employees who appear 
to have strong work ethics. While there are several attributes that relate to this behavior, the 
closest match is with the personality construct known as "conscientiousness." This 
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attribute has been found to be a reliable and consistent dimension of personality that can be 
identified and measured across individuals. It also relates strongly to job performance 
across types of jobs. Further, it appears to have a dispositional element that is stable across 
jobs and contexts. That is, conscientiousness is a characteristic of individuals, and those 
with it perform at a high level across situations (see, e.g., Judge and Ilies 2002 for a 
survey). 
The research on conscientiousness suggests that there is something very tangible to 
the notion of work ethic, that it is an attribute of individuals and affects performance across 
a range of settings. As a result, employers can expect to benefit from hiring conscientious 
workers and should be willing to make investments to do so. While it may be possible in 
some situations to create circumstances that cause applicants to sort themselves according 
to their work ethic, these circumstances are far from universal. In general, employers can 
be expected to have a keen interest in screening employees for work ethic.  The effects of 
employees' intrinsic motivation on firm performance are discussed by Kreps (1997) and 
Rob and Zemsky (2002), among others. 
Screening applicants for conscientiousness or work ethic involves costs, and firms 
therefore have to decide how much to spend on screening. There may well be a trade-off 
between screening and efforts to monitor employees: Greater use of screening can lead to a 
more conscientious work force that can perform at a given level with less monitoring, 
oversight, and performance-related incentives. Another option, in contrast, is to spend very 
little on screening but rely on intensive monitoring to maintain performance.  
We might also expect relationships between the monitoring/screening decision and 
the choice of work systems.  For example, employers with teamwork-based systems and 
those that rely on employee empowerment where monitoring by supervisors is more 
difficult should make greater investments in screening.   
Because information about conscientiousness is not readily or accurately available 
in the market (employers have to screen to find it), conscientiousness does not necessarily 
raise one’s market wage. Once workers with these characteristics are hired, however, they 
contribute value by reducing the need for monitoring costs, saving money for employers. 
In order to retain these conscientious workers, employers may be motivated to pay them 
higher compensation through rent sharing arrangements. We should therefore expect a 
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positive relationship between employer screening for work ethic and employee 
compensation. Alternatively, a regime of lower screening requires more intensive 
monitoring, which in turn makes it possible to hire less conscientious workers. They can be 
paid less than the more conscientious workers because their productivity is lower and there 
is no particular interest in retaining them.   
Recent empirical research on high performance work systems has focused attention 
on arrangements where work organization makes extensive use of teamwork and employee 
involvement practices. These systems have drawn attention because they appear to be more 
productive (MacDuffie 1996; Ichniowski et al 1999). The central element of these 
arrangements is that employees are more involved in decision making (Cappelli and 
Neumark 2001), which reduces the need for supervision. But because monitoring is lower, 
these arrangements require employees who are more committed to the organization, hence 
the alternative phrase for these arrangements, high commitment work systems (see 
Applebaum and Batt 1994 for a survey). 
Although some observers believe that work systems which increase employee 
empowerment make all workers more productive, an important part of these systems in 
practice appears to be screening employees carefully in order to identify those with 
unobserved human capital and dispositions that are consistent with the strong work ethic 
required in high commitment systems. Most of the research on employee screening in these 
contexts is anecdotal and based on case studies of individual companies such as NUMMI, 
the joint venture between Toyota and General Motors (Keller 1989), Saturn (Kochan and 
Rubenstein 2000), and Southwest Airlines (Hoffer-Gittel 2002). While more systematic 
studies of the relationship between applicant screening and other work practices seem 
largely neglected (see Wilk and Cappelli 2003 for an exception), descriptive findings like 
those above suggest that regimes with lower levels of employee monitoring should go 
together with practices of high investments in applicant screening. 
Arguments about complementarities between screening and the use of high 
performance practices associated with regimes of low employee monitoring would 
contribute to existing research on the synergies among work and human resource practices 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997). Hamilton, 
Nickerson, and Owan (2001), for example, estimate the effects of teamwork on worker 
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productivity in a garment plant and find that team-based systems make greater use of 
collaborative skills, which are less valuable in individual production. The above arguments 
also suggest a rational for the empirical findings where high performance practices are 
often associated with higher wages and employee productivity even when they are not 
associated with higher profits for firms (Lynch and Black 2003; Cappelli and Neumark 
2001, Appelbaum, Bailey, and Berg 2000, Cappelli and Carter, 2000). More generally, 
these arguments complement the recent work in labor economics showing that 
non-cognitive skills are important elements for individual earnings (Heckman 1999, 
Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne 2001, Persico, Postlewaite, and Silverman 2004).  
In the section that follows, we derive more formal hypotheses for the arguments 
above using a simple principal-agent model, which we then test empirically.  
2. A Simple Principal-Agent Model 
In this model, there is a continuum of agents indexed by [0,1]i ∈ . Principals are identical 
with unit mass. Each principal hires one agent from a pool of potential candidates to 
complete a project. The outcome is stochastic. If the agent makes the appropriate effort e , 
he produces 0h >  with probability [0,1]p ∈ and 0  with probability 1 p− . If the agent 
shirks, the probability of getting h  is [0,1)q ∈ , where q p< . The cost of effort is 2e , 
where 2hp e hq− >  holds so that making effort e  is the socially optimal choice.1 The 
reservation utility of agents/workers and the alternative return for principals/employers are 
normalized to zero. 
We implicitly assume that all agents have the same cognitive ability 0h ≥ , but they 
are  heterogeneous in their levels of conscientiousness, or their work ethic, which we see as 
including a disposition to work hard and cooperate with others in pursuing the employer’s 
goals. More specifically, an agent i  has a cooperative tendency 0iα ≥   which may take 
two different values. He is called a cooperative type if 0iα α= > , or a selfish type if 
0iα = . The proportion of cooperative type agents in the population is (0,1)ρ ∈ . In our 
model, the cooperative tendency measures the level of disutility or guilt he feels if he does 
                                                 
1This parametric model is used for simplicity. A general formulation would yield similar results. 
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not choose the socially optimal action.2 The joint distribution of cognitive ability h  and 
cooperative tendency iα  among agents indicates the quality of workforce in this economy. 
Agents are risk averse and thus prefer a constant wage to outcome-contingent 
incomes. To reduce shirking associated with a fixed wage, the principal can use screening 
and monitoring. The timeline of the game is illustrated as follows:  First, principals decide 
on a package of wage, benefits, screening and monitoring intensities. After observing the 
distribution of packages among firms, workers decide which firms to apply to for jobs. 
Some principals screen job candidates and hire only those perceived to be cooperative, 
while others randomly hire from the pool of job candidates. After the labor market clears 
where all workers and principals are matched, production starts on a project. Workers 
decide to work hard or shirk on the project, and they can consume the benefits immediately, 
regardless of whether shirking is eventually detected. Meanwhile, principals monitor 
workers to catch shirking. Finally, when the project is finished, principals pay wages to 
workers not found shirking and withhold them from those caught shirking – the equivalent 
of firing them. The game is then over. 
Suppose for an agent with a cooperative tendency iα , a principal chooses wage iw   
and a monitoring level [0,1]im ∈ , where im  is the probability that shirking is observed. 
The total monitoring cost is 2i mm k , where mk  measures the unit cost of using monitoring 
technologies such as video cameras and supervisors in the workplace. If the agent is caught 
shirking, he will get zero wage. A cooperative type agent incurs disutility or guilt α   
whenever he shirks, regardless of being caught or not by the principal. 
Let [0,1]s ∈  denote the screening intensity, such that the probability of detecting a 
selfish type agent is  s  , and the probability of misjudgment is 1 s− . A cooperative type 
agent is always revealed after being screened as long as the screening intensity is above a 
minimum level 0s >  . Under this screening scheme, a principal either screens agents with 
intensity s s≥  to recruit some cooperative types, or she does not screen at all. The reason 
is straightforward. By choosing s s′ < , a principal cannot recognize any cooperative agent 
                                                 
2It could also be interpreted as an agent's shirking cost. The results would not change if we use the pleasure 
derived from cooperation (instead of using the guilt from shirking) to model the cooperative tendency.  As 
noted earlier, it essentially captures a person's conscientiousness, which Shavell (2002) argues is formed in 
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and hence she will always end up with a selfish agent; but this can be achieved at a lower 
cost by not screening at all. 
If a principal screens with intensity s , a typical candidate screened is eventually 
hired with probability 1(1 )(1 )
r
sρ ρ+ − − ≡ , where r  denotes the average number of 
candidates screened for a job opening. Conditional on being hired, the probability of the 
worker being a cooperative type is rρ . Note that r  is a positive monotonic transformation 
of s  and measures the selectivity of the screening process. It follows from [0,1]s ∈  that  
1[1, ]r ρ∈ , where 1r =  means no screening and 1r ρ=  perfect screening. The total 
screening cost is assumed to be 212 ( 1) sr k− , where sk  indicates the unit cost of using 
screening schemes such as interviews. 
An implication of this screening process is that a proportion 1(1 ) 1
r
sρ− ≡ −  of 
selfish agents are not hired by screening firms. In the equilibrium, they would be absorbed 
by principals who choose not to screen at all. Because principals are otherwise identical, 
they must earn the same profit in equilibrium, regardless of screening or not. In other 
words, the proportion of screening principals is 1
r
, which is endogenously determined by 
the economy characterized by 2( , , , , , , , )s mh e k k p qρ α . 
2.1 The Optimization Problems 
The game is solved by backward induction. We first study a worker's decision as to 
whether to shirk or work hard, taking as given the incentive package ( , )i iw m  provided by 
firms. His utility is 
1
2 2
iw e−  when exerting effort e , and 
1
2 (1 )i i iw m α− −  if not. So he would 
not shirk if 
(1)                  12 2( )i i im w e α−≥ −  
holds.3 Because monitoring is costly, firms would always choose the minimum possible 
monitoring level to deter shirking. This leads to the relationship between wage and 
monitoring  
                                                                                                                                                 
one's childhood and becomes a stable character through one's life. 
3The condition holds trivially for agents with 2i eα ≥   who would never shirk due to high intrinsic 
incentives. Since this is not our focus, we assume 2eα <  . 
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(2)     ).()( 221 iii ewm α−= −  
Note that fixing ,iw  im
∗
 strictly decreases in iα  so that a principal can save on monitoring 
costs by hiring a cooperative type agent as opposed to a selfish one. This gives her the 
incentives to use screening schemes to distinguish and hire cooperative agents. Because 
screening is also costly, the optimal combination of screening and monitoring is affected 
by their relative costs. 
The optimization problem for principals falls into two cases: some principals 
screen while others do not. We assume for now both types of agents prefer to work for 
principals who screen and monitor less (recognizing that screening may prevent selfish 
applicants from being hired), which would be realized in equilibrium (see Lemma 1). 
2.1.1 Principals with No Screening 
The optimization problem for a non-screening principal is very simple since her agents will 
certainly be of the selfish type. The optimal incentive package ( , ) 0n nw m >  must satisfy 
condition (2) for 0iα = , which becomes 2 4n nw m e−= . Her objective function is 
max
m n
Qn  hp  wn  mn2k m
s.t. wn  mn2e4 .
 
Solving this out, we get the optimal solution 
.
,
2
1
4
1
2
mn
mn
kew
ekm
=
=
∗
−∗
 
Higher than the reservation wage zero, nw  is indeed an efficiency wage to reward effort 
and help prevent shirking. 
The profit is  
,2 2
122
mmnnn kehpkmwhpQ −=−−≡ ∗∗∗  
where 
1
22 22n n n m mM w m k e k
∗ ∗ ∗
≡ + =  is the economic governance cost of a non-screening 
principal. The alternative choice of a non-screening principal is zero wage and no 
monitoring, under which the agent always shirks and produces hq  on average. This 
implies that positive monitoring is chosen if and only if nQ hq∗ ≥ , that is, 
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(A1)    12 2( ) / 2 ,mk h p q e≤ −  
where the monitoring cost is low enough. This condition is assumed true. 
2.1.2 Principals with Perfect Screening 
Before solving the general optimization problem for screening principals, we first study the 
special case of perfect screening to illustrate the intuition. Principals choose the maximum 
screening intensity 1s =  so that only cooperative type agents are hired. As a result, the 
optimal incentive package ( , ) 0s sw m >  must satisfy condition (2) for iα α= , which 
becomes 2 2 2( )s sw m e α−= − ; and 1/r ρ=  holds by definition. The objective function of a 
perfect screening principal is 
2
2
2 2 2
1 1
max ( 1)
2
s.t. ( ) .
s
s s s m s
m
s s
Q hp w m k k
w m e
ρ
α−
≡ − − − −
= −
 
Solving this out, we get the optimal solution 
1 1 1
2 4 22 2( ) ,  and ( ) .s m s mm e k w e kα α−∗ ∗= − = −  
Note both monitoring and wage levels are lower: s nm m
∗ ∗<  and s nw w
∗ ∗< . So the economic 
governance cost 
1
222( )s mM e kα∗ ≡ −  is also smaller than that of a non-screening principal  
1
222n mM e k
∗
≡ . This is achieved, however, by incurring a screening cost 22
sk
ρ . In other words, 
screening principals substitute screening for monitoring to handle moral hazard problems.  
The resulted profit is  
1
2
2
2
2
12( ) .
2s m s
Q hp e k kρα
ρ
∗ −
= − − −  
Because principals are otherwise identical, those who screen could always get nQ∗  by not 
screening at all. Only when 0s nQ Q∗ ∗− ≥  holds would principals choose to screen, which 
happens under assumption 
(A2)     12
2
2
4
.
1s m
k kαρ
ρ
≤
−
 
2.1.3 Principals with Some Screening 
A typical screening principal has to choose an optimal package ( , , )w m r  to maximize her 
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profit. Actually the only reasonable set of ( , )w m  must satisfy condition (1) for iα α=  to 
guarantee that the cooperative type agent would not shirk, that is, 2 2 2( )w m e α−= −  holds.4 
Given this package, a cooperative agent will exert effort and produce hp , which happens 
with probability rρ ; a selfish agent will always shirk and produce hq , which happens 
with probability 1 rρ− . So a screening principal's objective function is 
2 2
,
2 2 2
1
max ( ) (1 )( (1 ) ) ( 1)
2
s.t. ( ) .
m s
m r
Q r hp w r hq m w m k r k
w m e
ρ ρ
α−
≡ − + − − − − − −
= −
 
Let ( , )r m∗ ∗  denote the optimal solution for screening principals. Its existence and 
characteristics are summarized in the following proposition. 
 Proposition 1.  (i) The optimal solution ( , )r m∗ ∗ is uniquely determined by 
(5)  
2 2 31
2
2 2 21
2
[ ( ) ( ) ]
,( )
m
s
h p q e k m
r
k e
ρ α
ρ α
∗
∗ − − − −
=
− −
 
(6)   
2 2
2 2 1 2 2 3(2 ( ) ) 2 ( ) ( ) 1 0.m
s s
e m k e m h p q
k k
ρ ρ
α α∗− − ∗− − − − + − − =  
The optimal wage is 2 2 2( )w m e α∗ ∗−= − . Perfect screening is a special case of this problem 
where 
1 1
2 421( ) ( )s mm r m e kρ α −∗ ∗ ∗= = = −  . 
(ii) Based on condition (5), 0r
m
∗
∗
∂
∂ <  ,  0
r
h
∗∂
∂ >  ,  0m
r
k
∗∂
∂ <  ,  0s
r
k
∗∂
∂ <  . 
(iii) nm m∗ ∗<  holds where screening principals monitor less; nQ Q∗ ∗>  holds under (A2). 
 Proof. In the appendix. 
 The proposition says that the optimal screening selectivity r∗  is negatively related 
to the optimal monitoring intensity m∗ , and both are uniquely determined by the economy. 
Conditional on the monitoring intensity, principals screen job candidates more selectively 
when the relevant cognitive ability h  is higher and when screening and monitoring are less 
costly. The total surplus Q∗  is higher under screening. 
                                                 
4It is too expensive to adopt ( )n nw m∗ ∗+  to prevent the selfish type agents from shirking as the non-screening 
principals do, given that she has already spent 212 ( 1) sr k−  on screening. On the other hand, conditional on 
the wage level ,w  monitoring more than the minimum level 
1
2 2( )w e α− −  is more costly and does not 
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2.2 The Equilibrium  
If a principal gets higher profit Q∗  if she screens agents than if she does not, then all 
principals would prefer to screen agents. But this cannot be so in equilibrium. In fact, given 
that principals are identical with equal mass as agents, competition among principals will 
eventually drive profits to nQ∗ . The extra profit nQ Q∗ ∗−  will go to the agent.5  So a 
cooperative employee/agent working for a principal with some screening would have 
income 
,
∗∗∗
−+= nc QQwI  
where 2 2 2( )w m e α∗ ∗−= − . This must be at least as big as nw∗ , the income he would have 
gotten working for a non-screening principal. So the parameters of the economy must 
satisfy c nI w
∗≥  to support an equilibrium where some principals screen job candidates. But 
this condition also implies that selfish agents would prefer to be hired by screening 
principals as well.  
 Lemma 1. If a cooperative agent prefers to work for a screening principal, then a selfish 
agent would also prefer to do so. 
 Proof. In the appendix. 
The lemma suggests that self-selection would not work here because the package 
that is attractive to cooperative agents would be just as attractive to selfish ones. So 
effective screening is necessary to help identify and separate the two types of employees. 
Though all agents prefer to work for principals who screen, some of those who are selfish  
are detected as a result of screening and hence are not hired by screening principals. These 
agents are of proportion 1(1 ) 1
r
sρ ∗∗− = − , and they have no choice but to work for 
non-screening principals. Other selfish agents are lucky enough to be missed by the 
screening process and secure jobs with the principals who screen, along with the 
cooperative agents. The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium result. 
 Proposition 2. In equilibrium, a proportion  1
r
∗   of principals screen job candidates with 
intensity r∗ , monitor hired workers with intensity m∗ , offer wage w∗  and benefits  
                                                                                                                                                 
reduce shirking for either type of agents. 
5
 The screening principals may share some of the extra profit with agents when there are market frictions. 
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nQ Q∗ ∗−  to their agents; the other principals do not screen job candidates, monitor hired 
workers with intensity nm
∗
, offer wage nw∗  with no benefits to their agents. Both types of 
agents prefer to work for screening principals. 
2.3 The Empirical Implications 
This simple model has many interesting empirical implications, which are tested 
empirically below. Its main prediction is of an inverse relationship between screening 
selectivity r∗  and monitoring intensity m∗ , which is given by condition (5). The 
corresponding econometric model is denoted by 
(5’)                 0 + .m h k m s s r r rr m h k kβ β β β β β ξ ε∗ ∗= + + + + +  
where
r
ε is a random element. The signs of coefficients 0mβ < , 0hβ > , 0kβ < , and 0sβ <  
are determined by the corresponding partial derivatives in Proposition 1. Note that 
estimating (5’) using OLS may be biased since m∗  is an endogenous variable 
simultaneously determined with r∗ . This prompts us to use 2SLS where m∗  is estimated 
first based on the linear approximation of (6). The term 
r
ξ  denotes the set of control 
variables that may absorb the effects of difficult-to-measure variables in the model 
including the optimal effort level e , the stochastic features of production function captured 
by p and q , and the portion of cooperative agents in the population ρ  and the level of 
cooperative tendencyα .  
The second prediction is that the employee incomes are higher when the 
monitoring intensity is lower. In the model, a worker’s income is composed of two distinct 
parts, one is the pure incentive wage w∗  and a bonus nQ Q∗ ∗− . In the data, it is plausible 
that the reported employee wage W contains both w∗  and a base salary proportional to 
nQ Q∗ ∗−  such that ( )nW w Q Qω∗ ∗ ∗= + −  with [0,1)ω ∈ . And the reported level of 
employee benefits B is the residual part of nQ Q∗ ∗−  where (1 )( )nB Q Qω ∗ ∗= − − . Plugging 
1
B
nQ Q ω∗ ∗ −− =  and 2 2 2( )w m e α∗ ∗−= −  into the equation of W , we get 
(7)    2 2 2( ) .W m e Bωα φ∗−= − +  
The corresponding econometric model is denoted by 
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 (7’)    0 ,m w w wW m Bωφ φ φ φ ξ ε∗= + + + +  
The signs of coefficients 0mφ <  and 0ωφ ≥  are derived from (7). Again wξ  denotes 
control variables including effort e  and cooperative tendencyα , and wε  is a random term. 
The third prediction is the positive relationship between screening intensity and 
worker productivity.6 Among firms with some screening, the average productivity of 
workers is 
(8)   (1 ) ( ) ,P r hp r hq h p q r hqρ ρ ρ∗ ∗ ∗= + − = − +  
which strictly increases in r∗ . This equation is estimated by 
(8’)    0 ,r h p p pP r hγ γ γ γ ξ ε∗= + + + +  
where 0
r
γ >  and 0hγ >  should hold according to (8). The control variables in term pξ  
are p and q , some stochastic features of production, and pε  is the residual term. 
3. Data Description 
Equations (5’), (7’), and (8’) are estimated using data from the 1997 National Employer 
Survey, an establishment level survey of employment practices conducted by the U.S. 
Bureau of Census. It is a nationally representative sample of private establishments with 
more than 20 employees. In terms of criteria such as representativeness, response rate, and 
breadth of questions about work practices and organizational characteristics, it appears to 
be the broadest and best data available on employer practices and, therefore, for testing our 
results (see Cappelli 2001 for an extensive description of the NES). The summary statistics 
of variables are listed in Table A. 
The NES97 asks a series of questions about how the employer selects employees -- 
what type of information about applicants do they collect and how important is each in 
their hiring decision. The stem of the question asks the plant or office manager: “After you 
have established your applicant pool and obtained information about potential [production 
or front-line job title provided earlier by the respondent] employee, what characteristics or 
attributes are most critical in making your hiring decision?” The importance scale ranges 
                                                 
6
 Though it is possible to have three types of screening intensity ( 0, 1, (0,1))s s s= = ∈ , most firms are 
likely to have (0,1)s ∈ . Indeed, perfect monitoring and perfect screening may be feasible only in very small 
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from no value at 1 to important at 3 and to essential at 5. Respondents use this scale to  
assess twelve general characteristics and attributes about applicants. The details of these 
characteristics and their means and standard deviations are presented in Table A. 
Screening for Work Ethic. Our first task is to measure the extent to which 
employers are attempting to identify the unobserved human capital that would be 
necessary for them to be productive in a regime of low supervision and monitoring, what 
we might think of as their intrinsic work ethic or cooperative tendencies. Four items seem 
specifically oriented toward that goal: screening for applicant attitude, high-quality 
performance at previous jobs, communication skills, and participation in community 
and/or extra-curricular activities. Applicant attitude may be the most general attribute and 
is presumably capturing a range of work-related attributes other than ability, such as 
motivation and willingness to work hard (see Cappelli 1995). It is also the most important 
criterion reported by employers, with mean 4.4 and standard error 0.78. In the absence of 
close supervision and monitoring, employees need to work together and communicate with 
each other to coordinate efforts and solve problems.  Communication skills are therefore 
particularly important to effective work performance in a low monitoring environment.  
Participation in community and/or extra-curricular activities reveals a willingness to work 
on projects that may not offer monetary or even extrinsic rewards, consistent with 
conscientiousness and a strong work ethic.  Community and extra-curricular activities 
typically involve group-based tasks, requiring cooperative skills, and community activities 
in particular may also capture an interest in altruistic goals.  Performance in previous jobs 
may reflect a range of success factors in addition to intrinsic motivation and cooperative 
attributes.  As such, we also examine the relationships without this variable. (All of the 
main results are unchanged when we use the attitude variable alone or when using the 
average of screening selectivity on attitude and communication skills in a robustness 
check.) The average importance of these four components is used to measure the 
employer's interest in screening for the attributes associated with operating in a regime of 
low monitoring and supervision. It has mean 3.57 and standard error 0.65. 
Screening Selectivity in Cognitive Ability. We use the average importance of six 
other criteria -- including industry based credentials, education level (years completed), 
                                                                                                                                                 
firms, which are ruled out in our data. So the empirical implications are restricted to firms with (0,1)s ∈ . 
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school reputation, academic performance, technical course work, and general course work 
-- to measure a different kind of screening, the effort to identify cognitive skills. Its mean is 
2.81 with standard deviation 0.68. The cognitive requirement of jobs is examined 
separately by years of completed schooling for production and front-line employees, the 
focus of the study, across establishments. 
Monitoring Intensity. We use several variables to measure the extent of employee 
monitoring across establishments, especially the low monitoring environment associated 
with teamwork, employee involvement, and high performance work systems.  The 
regularly scheduled meetings where employees discuss workplace problems is the most 
extensively used of the low monitoring practices with 85% of all establishments in the 
sample report making at least some use of them. In comparison, only 41% firms adopt 
self-managed teams.  Regularly scheduled meetings to discuss work related issues may 
also be the most basic type of employee involvement (Cappelli and Carter 2000) while self 
managed teams, where the team takes over much of the traditional responsibilities of 
supervisors, may be the most intensive application of a low monitoring environment. 
While teamwork of this kind reduces monitoring by management, in closely-knit teams, 
group norms become important, and the group members may end up policing each other's 
performance (Kandel and Lazear 1992).  
An alternative measure of monitoring intensity is the employee-supervisor ratio 
(Leonard 1987), the number of employees supervised by an individual manager. The 
assumption is that a lower ratio allows for closer supervision and monitoring by managers. 
On closer inspection, however, this measure has several drawbacks as a proxy for 
monitoring. Monitoring may take place through ways other than one's immediate 
supervisor, the relationship measured by supervisory ratios. And supervisors perform  
tasks in addition to monitoring. For example, about 20 percent of supervisors' time is 
devoted to providing informal training (see 1994 NES survey). They may also perform 
some of the tasks that their supervisees perform, especially if the supervisor operates in the 
mode of a lead worker. If the supervisory ratio captures in part efforts to train and instruct 
the workforce and perform some worker tasks, it may be driven in part by factors other 
than the interest in monitoring employees. More troubling, it may covary with factors 
considered below in unexpected ways. For example, supervisory ratios may be higher for 
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less skilled workers, independent of work ethic, because supervisory training is 
substituting for employee skill. Nonetheless, the employee-supervisory ratio is used as an 
alternative measure of monitoring intensity in the robustness check. 
Other measures of work practices such as the adoption of re-engineering, job 
rotation, and organizational benchmarking, are included as controls to capture potentially 
omitted variables that may covary with selection intensity.  They capture the extent to 
which an employer has more sophisticated practices of all kinds, takes management more 
seriously, or differs in approaches to management that may affect the behavior of 
employees. These variables have little effect on our main results. We also include detailed 
industry and size dummies to control for potential variations in the costs or ability to screen 
and monitor employees (e.g., scale economies) and conduct the analyses separately for 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. The fact that the questions in our survey are 
focused on front-line production employees greatly narrows the range of possible jobs 
being examined and helps control for exogenous sources of variation. The percentage of 
minorities and the percentage of women among employees are used as a proxy for diversity 
of the workforce, which may also affect screening costs. Other potential factors affecting 
monitoring costs are the use of computers on the job (possibly making tasks easier to 
monitor) and union strength (possibly restricting the ability of the employer to monitor or 
to take actions based on monitoring). Some of these variables, such as computer usage, 
may be determined simultaneously with screening and monitoring intensity and hence may 
cause endogeneity problems. To check for this, we also run regressions excluding possible 
endogenous inputs to test for robustness. 
The remaining elements in the model are parameters of the production functions 
that are very difficult to observe, including the desired effort level e , the stochastic features 
of production function captured by p and q , and workforce characteristics such as the 
portion of cooperative agents in the population ρ  and the level of cooperative tendencyα . 
As long as they vary systematically across industry, occupation, and size, however, the 
detailed industry, sector, and size dummies and the restriction to production jobs should 
capture the important aspects of production functions.  Though various specifications are 
used to check the robustness of our results, it is always important to keep the effects of 
omitted variables in mind and be cautious when interpreting the results. 
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4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Screening and Monitoring 
Results of the analyses examining the relationship between screening for work ethic and 
monitoring intensity are presented in Table 1. They are based on equation (5’), which is 
presented below using variable names: 
0ScreenSelectivity MonitorIntensity MonitorCost ScreenCost
WorkerCognitiveSkills Controls ,
m k s
h r r
β β β β
β β ε
= + + +
+ + +
 
We first use employee involvement in regular work meetings as the measure of monitoring 
intensity where more extensive use of work-related meetings proxy less intensive 
monitoring of performance.7 The coefficients of regular work meetings are almost always 
significant at 1% level across various specifications. Both the scale and significance levels 
increase when computer usage, minority and union ratios are excluded (results not reported 
here). These results suggest that there is a synergy between screening employees for work 
ethic consistent with cooperative behavior and the use of low-monitoring work practices 
that make use of such behavior. In other words, these practices are complementary. More 
generally, the results are consistent with the notion that there may be a trade-off between 
management approaches that rely on conscientious workers and empowered working 
arrangements versus those that rely on high levels of monitoring. 
 For a robustness check, the bottom rows of table 1 show the results of using two 
alternative measures of monitoring intensity instead of regular work meetings. The results 
are very similar. The coefficients of teamwork are positive and significant at 1% level 
across various specifications. In the case of the employee-supervisor ratio, its coefficients 
are positive and significant in 2SLS specifications for the whole sample and the 
manufacturing sector, though they are insignificant for non-manufacturing sectors or under 
OLS.9  The pattern of insignificant relationships in non-manufacturing is common across 
                                                 
7
 In the first stage regression of regular work meetings, the controls listed in the table are used as well as 
women ratio, job rotation and hierarchy levels. The last two variables are not correlated with the screening 
selectivity at p value 0.1. 
9
 Note the relevant coefficients of monitoring intensity in 2SLS specification are (at least) about five times as 
large as those under OLS. 
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studies of high performance work systems (Cappelli and Neumark 2001; Lynch and Black 
2004) and may reflect greater heterogeneity across non-manufacturing jobs and less clarity 
in the use of concepts like teamwork there.  
 In the last column, we include the effects associated with selectivity on cognitive 
ability. Because screening for cognitive skills is likely to be endogenous, it is regressed 
first on the same set of controls as listed in the table as well as on schooling and working 
hours of the four categories of employees. Employee involvement in regular work 
meetings is still significant at the 1% level, although its scale is slightly reduced.10 The 
large coefficient and high significance level of selectivity on cognitive skills suggest that 
firms that are selective in screening for good work ethic are also selective in screening 
cognitive skills. To rule out the possibility that a common underlying factor is driving the 
results in both cases, we switch the positions of cognitive skill selectivity and screening 
selectivity for work ethic in a 2SLS regression. Involvement in regular work meetings is no 
longer significant, as predicted. This suggests screening for other attributes, such as 
cognitive ability, does not produce the above results. 
We also examine the ratio of minorities as a positive indicator of screening costs 
(Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). It indeed appears to have negative effects on screening 
selectivity, as predicted by the model. The effects of computer use both by supervisors and 
production employees increases screening for work ethic.  Computer use may suggest 
greater operating autonomy by employees, more difficulty in monitoring (n.b., using a 
computer does not mean that work output is computerized), and a greater need for more 
cooperative employees. The ratio of employees represented by unions reduces this 
screening in all specifications. Unionization may be a proxy for workplaces that have less 
employee empowerment and therefore less need for this screening. Higher computer usage 
appears to reduce the unit monitoring cost while higher union coverage increases it. These 
results are consistent with our model where screening selectivity decreases with 
monitoring costs once the effect of monitoring intensity is controlled. The level of 
schooling as an indicator of cognitive ability, in addition to the selectivity on cognitive 
skills, has positive and mostly significant effects on screening selectivity for work ethic. 
                                                 
10
 In the OLS regression and 2SLS for the manufacture sector, the results including selectivity on cognitive 
skills as an additional regressor are similar to those presented. 
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This is also consistent with our model. Months to reach job proficiency, a measure of 
firm-specific skills which may affect screening selectivity through channels of 
firm-specific training and longer tenures, is never significant. 
For a robustness check, we also investigate whether screening predicts various 
measures of low monitoring. Since monitoring and screening intensities are determined 
simultaneously in the model, it should not matter which one is treated as the dependent 
variable. The empirical results (available upon request) are exactly as predicted. In 2SLS 
regressions using either regular meeting, teamwork, or the employee-supervisor ratio as 
the dependent variable and the same set of controls, the coefficients of screening are 
positive and significant in all three cases. These results are robust to various controls in the 
first stage regression. 
4.2 Wage, Monitoring, and Non-cognitive Skills 
The results examining the relationship between wages and monitoring intensity are 
presented in Table 2. They are based on equation (7’) displayed below in variable names. 
0Logwage MonitorIntensity EmployeeBenefits Controls .m w wωφ φ φ φ ε= + + + +  
The monitoring intensity is again measured by employee involvement in regular work 
meetings. The R-square and the coefficients for the control variables (schooling, employee 
benefits, the ratios of minority and women, union representation, and working hours per 
week) are strikingly similar and stable across various specifications using OLS. The signs 
are also intuitively correct. Once these important variables are controlled, screening 
selectivity for cognitive skills has no significant effects on the wage level in all 
specifications. Its effects are negative once selectivity on work ethic is included and in the 
2SLS specification as well. Note that the coefficient of regular work meetings in 2SLS 
specification is about ten times as high as those under OLS.11 
In sharp contrast, screening for work ethic is always positive and significant across 
specifications, even when work practice variables are included, as in the last column. The 
implication is quite clear: screening for unobserved human capital associated with work 
ethics is associated with higher wages. This result supports and extends the notion that 
                                                 
11
 In the first stage regression of regular work meetings, only hierarchy level is included as control because it 
is the only work practice variable that is uncorrelated with wages at p value 0.01. Both selectivity on 
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wages are higher where firms use high performance work practices because those practices 
demand more from employees. What they demand, though, are competencies associated 
with a strong work ethic and cooperative tendencies rather than cognitive ability. The 
results are similar in all specifications when education levels and working hours by 
occupations are included to control for the potential complementarities or substitution of 
educational human capital between different categories of employees in the same firm. 
In our model, an employee's wage is uniquely determined when the monitoring 
level is chosen. Wages and monitoring are always negatively related across firms for the 
same employee because both represent explicit incentives aimed to reduce shirking. So 
wages should be positively related to employee involvement in regular work meetings. 
Across both employee and firm, the relationship becomes more complicated because high 
monitoring firms with no screening may still pay higher wages to employees to encourage 
efficiency wage effects. Because of this relationship, we control for screening selectivity in 
the last two columns of the wage equation. The fact that screening selectivity and 
monitoring intensity are uniquely determined may explain why the coefficients and 
R-squared change little across various OLS specifications. 
4.3 Productivity, Screening, and Monitoring 
The NES data also allow us to examine how screening and monitoring may be related to 
some aspects of productivity. A question in the data about average worker productivity 
asks the plant or establishment manager, “Compared to your major competitors, do you 
consider your employees' productivity to be higher, lower, or the same?” About half of the 
respondents consider their employees' productivity higher and the other half lower or the 
same, which suggests that this subjective productivity measure may be a reliable measure. 
We construct a dichotomous variable named “relative productivity,” which equals 1 if it is 
higher than competitors and 0 if not. The corresponding econometric equation (8’) is 
displayed below in variable names. 
0Pr(higher productivity) ScreenSelectivity CognitiveAbility Controls .r h p pγ γ γ γ ε= + + + +  
 This relationship between screening and productivity is a reduced form derived in 
                                                                                                                                                 
cognitive skills and average benefits are regressed first on schooling and working hours of other categories of 
employees in addition to the controls listed in the table. 
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the model. The intuition is that with better screening, workers hired are more conscientious 
and thus shirk less, so the average productivity should be higher. Since the relative 
employee productivity is not a choice variable but a result of many elements, we can treat 
screening selectivity as an exogenous variable not correlated with the random term when 
relevant elements are controlled. 
 In the probit regressions of various specifications shown in Table 3, the screening 
selectivity of cooperative behavior is indeed positively and significantly related to a firm's 
relative productivity. Average education levels of employees have positive, though often 
not significant, effects on a firm's relative productivity.  The variable for cognitive skills 
screening is often significant at the 10% level. Firms with similar job requirements may 
have employees with similar education levels, but perhaps screening for both cooperative 
behavior and cognitive skills represents a less well-known approach to finding an effective 
workforce by measuring difficult-to-observe human capital.  The effects of working hours 
per week on productivity are positive, though not significant when more work practices are 
controlled. The minority ratio and the union variable tend to reduce a firm's relative 
productivity, while the ratio of women has a positive, though not significant, influence. 
When work practices are included as regressors, the coefficients of screening selectivity on 
work ethic are reduced slightly, suggesting complementarities between them. 
 Comparing the results of the last two columns, we can see the positive and 
significant effects of regular work meetings on relative productivity controlling for other 
work practices. Teamwork (not shown in the table) also has a positive and significant 
influence in these two regressions, while other control variables (including benchmarking, 
reengineering, job rotation, employee-supervisor ratio, and hierarchy level) remain 
insignificant. The main results are robust when we include more regressors such as a firm's 
capital stock, new equipment, production costs, temporary workers, education levels of 
other occupations, computer usage, etc. The results with these additional controls are 
available upon request. It is worth noting, however, that this productivity measure does not 
necessarily estimate costs and therefore efficiency. It is possible that the costs associated 
with screening – including higher wages -- may offset any productivity gains. 
The amount of sale per employee is an alternative productivity measure that has 
been used before with NES97 data. For a robustness check, we also examined the effect of 
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screening selectivity on this measure. The main results can be summarized as follows 
(details are available upon request). In the OLS regressions, there are positive and 
significant effects of selectivity for work ethic on sales for the manufacturing sector, which 
are robust to various controls. The effects are positive but not significant for the 
non-manufacturing sector. This pattern is similar to the results found by other researchers 
(Cappelli and Neumark 2001; Lynch and Black 2004).  The effects of selectivity in 
cognitive skills are never significant and sometime negative. 
5. Conclusions 
We analyze the relationship between screening selectivity and monitoring intensity in the 
context of a principal-agent model and test the theoretical results using a national sample of 
U.S. establishments. We find that more selective screening for work ethic, but not for 
cognitive ability, is indeed related to less monitoring and greater use of high involvement 
work practices that require cooperative employee behavior. It also leads to higher worker 
productivity and higher wages and benefits. The underlying intuition is that a screening 
firm hires conscientious workers who are willing to work hard with less monitoring. These 
employers can then make use of practices that involve workers more and monitor them less. 
Reduced monitoring costs improve firm performance and allow the firm to share rents in 
the form of higher wages in order to attract and retain these good workers. Our theoretical 
model also provides a useful framework to interpret many empirical results in previous 
studies about work practices and their effects on productivity and worker compensation. In 
future work, it would be interesting to examine in more detail the choices that employers 
make with respect to the screening of job applicants. 
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Table A: Summary Statistics 
Variable Names 
         Mean  
(Std.  Dev.) Obs. 
Screening Selectivity 
“After you have established your applicant pool and obtained information about potential [production 
or front-line job title] employees, what characteristics or attributes are most critical in making your 
hiring decision?”  Please rank each method (5 = Essential, 4 = Very Important, 3 = Important, 2 = Is of 
Some Value, 1 = No Value). 
Screening Selectivity on Cooperative Tendency 3.57 (.65) 2741 
Attitude 4.40 (0.78) 2746 
Previous job performance 3.99 (0.96) 2749 
Communication skills 3.80 (1.03) 2749 
Extra-curricular activities 2.11 (0.97) 2747 
Selectivity on Cognitive Skills 2.81 (0.68) 2722 
Full-time work experience 3.83 (0.93) 2751 
After-school or summer work 2.55 (1.03) 2742 
Industry based credentials 3.33 (1.23) 2749 
Education level (years completed) 3.05 (1.00) 2746 
School reputation 2.04 (0.98) 2746 
Academic performance 2.52 (1.06) 2748 
Technical course work 2.79 (1.14) 2742 
General course work 2.38 (0.95) 2745 
   
Work Organization and Design 
What percent of non-managerial and non-supervisory employees are involved 
in regularly scheduled meetings to discuss work-related issues? .57 (.43) 2898 
Teamwork: What percent or how many of non-managerial and 
non-supervisory employees are currently involved in self-managed teams? .16 (.30) 2928 
Has your establishment participated in any benchmarking programs that 
compare your practices and performances with other organizations? .33 (.47) 2861 
Has your establishment undergone re-engineering within the past three years? .38 (.49) 2934 
What percent or how many of non-managerial and non-supervisory employees 
are currently involved in job rotation? .20 (.31) 2935 
Hierarchy levels: How many levels are there between a front-line supervisor 
and the top official in your establishment? 2.6 (2.7) 2903 
Employee-supervisor ratio: On average, how many employees report to each 
front-line supervisor? 19 (21) 2771 
 
  
Workforce Characteristics 
What percent or how many of your permanent employees are women? .39 (.26) 2883 
What percent or how many of your permanent employees are minorities? .27 (.26) 2829 
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Variable Names (cont.) 
    Mean  
(std. dev.) Obs. 
What is the average number of years of completed schooling for the following 
categories of employees? 
the production employees 
Office/clerical/sales/customer service 
Technical/technical support 
supervisors 
Management/professionals 
 
 
12 (1.3) 
12.64 (1.05) 
14.30 (1.66) 
13.31 (1.48) 
15.35 (1.48) 
 
 
2663 
2700 
2129 
2415 
2801 
How many hours per week, including overtime, do the following categories of 
employees typically work?  
the production employees  
Office/clerical/sales/customer service 
Technical/technical support 
supervisors 
Management/professionals 
 
 
43.05 (6.02)  
40.69 (3.41) 
43.72 (5.33) 
45.99 (5.55) 
47.39 (6.36) 
 
 
2740 
2780 
2192 
2481 
2878 
  
 
Compensation and Benefits 
What is the average pay for the full-time production employees? 27322 
(12230) 2495 
Average employee benefits: Does your establishment contribute toward any 
of the following employee benefits? (a) Pension plan, (b) Severance plan, (c) 
Medical or health insurance (d) Dental care benefits, (e) Child care benefits, (f) 
Family leave, (g) Life insurance, (h) Sick pay, (i) Paid vacation/holidays, (j) 
Stock options or profit sharing 
.70 (.19) 2855 
Union: What percent or how many of your non-managerial, non-supervisory 
employees are covered by a collective-bargaining agreement? .20 (.36) 2943 
 
  
Other Variables 
Relative productivity: Compared to your major competitors, do you consider 
your employees’ productivity to be higher, lower, or the same? .50 (.50) 2804 
Computer usage (supervisors): 
What percent of your managers and supervisors use computers in their jobs? .82 (.28) 2732 
Computer usage (production employees): 
What percent of your production [sales/customer service/other front line] and 
non-supervisory employees use computers in their jobs? 
.45 (.38) 2699 
Training expenditure: What did your establishment spend last year on formal 
training programs? (in thousand) 
19.07    
(17.32) 1682 
How many weeks does it take to fill a typical [production job title] opening? 3.19 (3.13) 2693 
How many candidates do you interview for each [production job title] 
opening? 6.71 (8.29) 2557 
Manufacture sector .59 (.49) 3081 
5 size dummies and 21 industry dummies  3081 
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Table 1: The Relationship between Screening Selectivity for Cooperative Tendency and 
Monitoring Intensity (as Measured by Regular Work Meetings) 
 
2SLS  2SLS 
(All 
Sectors) 
Manufacture       Non-man. 
OLS 2SLS 
Regular work 
meetings 
.0082** 
(.0022)     
.0075**   
(.0026)      
.0098*   
(.0036)      
.0014** 
(.0003)     
.0061**   
(.002) 
Schooling  .048**  
(.014) 
.0005    
(.028)      
.066**   
(.017)      
.06**  
(.012) 
.014  
(.017) 
Minority ratio -.0023*  
(.0005) 
-.0016*   
(.0007)     
-.0013   
(.001)     
-.0014**  
(.0005) 
-.0008   
(.0006) 
Union ratio -.0002  
(.0004) 
-.0002   
(.0005)     
-.0001   
(.0009)     
-.0007 
(.0004)     
-.001**   
(.0004) 
Working hours per 
week 
.002    
(.003)     
.002    
(.004)     
.005    
(.005)     
.002    
(.003) 
.002    
(.003)     
Computer usage 
(supervisors) 
.0009 
(.0006) 
.0011   
(.0008)      
.0004   
(.001)      
.0018**   
(.0005)      
.0007   
(.0007) 
Computer usage 
(production employees) 
.0006 
(.0005)      
.0001   
(.0008)      
.0015*   
(.0008)      
.0012**   
(.0004)      
.00005   
(.0005) 
Months to reach job 
proficiency 
.0018 
 (.0012) 
.0035   
(.0018)      
-.0004   
(.0017)     
.0018  
(.0012)      
.0004   
(.001) 
selectivity on 
cognitive skills 
    .31  
(.19)^ 
Industry and size 
dummies  
Included Included Included Included Included 
Observation 2087 1337 750 2138 1363 
R-square - - - 0.17 - 
Teamwork# 
 
.012** 
(.003)  
.009** 
 (.003) 
.017^ 
(.009) 
.0016** 
(.0004) 
.010**    
(.003) 
Employee-supervisor 
ratio# 
.023** 
(.007)  
.012* 
 (.005) 
-.015 
(.018) 
.0007 
(.0007) 
.012**    
(.004) 
 
** p<.01, * p<.05, ^ p<.1. 
#
 The variable is used in place of regular meetings to measure monitoring intensity, while other 
inputs are the same as above.
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Table 2: The Relationship between Log Wage and Monitoring Intensity  
(as Measured by Regular Work Meetings) 
  
 OLS 2SLS OLS  OLS OLS 
Regular work 
meetings 
.0003*   
(.00015)      
.0037^    
(.002)     
 .0003*    
(.00015) 
.0003^ 
(.0002)      
Screening 
selectivity on 
cooperative 
tendency 
  .041** 
(.012) 
.040** 
(.012) 
.041** 
(.013) 
selectivity on 
cognitive skills 
.014 
(.0096)      
-.0038 
(.16)      
-.0052   
(.012) 
-.007   
(.012) 
        
-.0025  
(.013)     
Schooling  .095**   
(.0058) 
.080**   
(.011) 
.093**   
(.0058) 
.094**   
(.0058) 
.093**  
(.0065) 
Employee benefits .35**    
(.038)      
.93^    
(.49) 
.35** 
(.037)     
.34** 
(.038) 
.35** 
(.044)      
Minority ratio -.0012**   
(.0002) 
-.0007^   
(.0004) 
-.0012**   
(.0002)     
-.0012**   
(.0002) 
-.001**  
(.0003) 
Ratio of women -.0045**   
(.0003)    
-.0048**   
(.0006)    
-.0045**   
(.0003)    
-.0045**   
(.0003) 
-.0045**   
(.0004)    
Union ratio .0018**   
(.0002)     
.0016**   
(.0004)     
.0018**   
(.0002) 
.0018**   
(.0002) 
.0018** 
(.0002)     
Working hours per 
week 
.018**   
(.001)     
.015**   
(.002)     
.017** 
(.001)     
.017** 
(.001) 
.017**   
(.001)     
Other work 
practices^^ 
    Included 
Industry and size 
dummies  
Included Included Included Included Included 
Observation 2182 1272 2200 2179 1728 
R-square      0.56 - 0.56 0.56 0.57 
 
** p<.01, * p<.05, ^ p<.1.  
^^ --The other work practices include teamwork, benchmarking, re-engineering, job rotation, 
hierarchy level, and employee-supervisor ratio. 
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Table 3: The Relationship between Relative Productivity and Screening  
 
 Probit (1) Probit (2) Probit (3) Probit (4) 
Screening selectivity on 
cooperative tendency 
.16**   
(.054)      
.19** 
(.07) 
.13* 
(.058)    
.11^ 
(.058) 
Schooling  .053*  
(.025)      
.07* 
(.03) 
.038 
(.027)      
.034 
(.027) 
Selectivity on cognitive 
skills 
.089^    
(.051)      
.038 
(.068) 
.098^    
(.054)     
.098^ 
(.054) 
Minority ratio -.002^   
(.0011) 
-.0016 
(.0014) 
-.0023*   
(.001) 
-.0012**   
(.0002)     
Ratio of women .0023  
(.0015)      
.003 
(.002)     
.0013   
(.0016) 
.0015   
(.0016)    
Union ratio -.002**   
(.0002)     
-.003**   
(.001) 
-.003**    
(.0008) 
-.003**   
(.0008) 
Working hours per week .0086^   
(.005)      
.011^   
(.007)     
.0075   
(.0053)      
.007  
(.005)      
Regular work meetings    .0026**   
(.0007) 
Other working practices^^   Included Included 
Other control variables^^^  Included   
Industry and size dummies  Included Included Included Included 
Observation 2362 1392 2126 2115 
Pseudo R square      0.043 0.046 0.049 0.053 
 
** p<.01, * p<.05, ^ p<.1.  
^^  -- The other work practices include teamwork, benchmarking, re-engineering, job rotation, 
hierarchy level, and employee-supervisor ratio. 
^^^ -- Other control variables include training expenditure, weeks to fill a job opening, and the 
number of candidates interviewed. Only training is significant. 
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Appendix 
1. The proof for proposition 1. 
A screening principal's objective function is 
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where the second equality holds by plugging in  2 2 2( )w m e α−= −  . The interior first order 
conditions are 
(9)   1 2 21(1, ] : ( ) ( ) 0,sr h p q m e rkρ ρ αρ
∗ −∈ − − − − =  
(10)  2 2 1 2 2 3: (1 )( ) 2 ( ) 2 0.mm r e m e m kρ α α∗ −− − − + − − =  
Solving the term  1 2 2( )m e α− −   from condition m* and plugging it into r*, we get 
condition (5): 
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A sufficient condition for 0r∗ ≥  is 
(A3)    2 2 21 ( ) .
2s
k eρ α> −  
Solving out  r   from condition (9) and plugging it to (10), we get 
2 2
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3( , ( )) ( ) [ ( ) 1] [2 ( ) ] ( ) 2 0.m m
s s
Q m r m e h p q e m e m k
k k
ρ ρ
α α α−= − − − + − − − − =  
This is exactly condition (6), which uniquely determines m∗  since its second derivative 
06)(])(2[ 222222
2
<−−−−−= − m
s
mm kmemek
Q ααρ   
is strictly negative under assumption (A3). 
This in turn implies that  r∗   is uniquely determined by condition (5), which 
obviously decreases in  m∗   when all exogenous parameters  2( , , , , , , , )s mh e k k p qρ α   are 
controlled. Conditional on  m∗   and other parameters,  r∗   increases in the cognitive ability  
h   and in the absolute effect of employee shirking ( )h p q− . 
It is easy to check that  nm m
∗ ∗<  . Plug  
1
4
n mm ek
−∗
=   into (10) we get  
1
42 2 1 2 2 4(1 )( ) 2 [( ) ] 0mr e e k e eρ α α−− − − + − − <  . Since the second derivative of (10) w.r.t.  
m   is strictly negative, nm m
∗ ∗<  must be true. That is, screening principals indeed adopt 
lower monitoring intensity than non-screening principals. The optimal wage is  
2 2 2( )w m e α∗ ∗−= −   by condition (2). 
Perfect screening is a special case of this solution where principals choose the 
maximum screening intensity such that 1/r ρ=  and only cooperative type agents are hired. 
Plugging  1r ρ
∗
=   into the first order conditions we get  
1 1
2 42( )s mm e kα −∗ = −   from (10), and  
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3 1
2 4
2
2( ) ( )sk mh p q e kρ α≤ − − −   from (5). When 
(11)    4123)()( 22 ms keqph
k
α
ρ
−−−>  
is true, we get  1r ρ
∗ ≤   from (5). That is, sm m∗ ∗<   if (11) holds, while  sm m∗ ∗=   otherwise. 
This means ( , ( )) ( , ( ))s sQ m r m Q m r m Q∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗≤ ≡  must be true when (11) is true. Since 
*( , ( ))n s s sQ Q m r m Q∗ ∗ ∗< =  under assumption (A2), it follows that nQ Q∗ ∗>   must also hold. 
To guarantee  1r∗ >  , (9) must be positive when  1r =   is plugged in. That is,  
2 2
1( ) ( )sk h p q m eρ α∗< − − −   should hold, where  1 ( 1)m m r∗ ∗≡ =  . But we know  1 nm m∗ ∗<  , 
which means  2 2( ) ( )sk nh p q m eρ α∗< − − −   or 
(12)  412321 )()1()( 22 ms keeqph
k
α
α
ρ
−−−−<  
is a sufficient condition for 1r∗ > . Since 1ρ < , both (11) and (12) can be true. 
 
2. The proof for lemma 1. 
Note that a selfish agent gets utility 
1
2 (1 ) nw m Q Q∗ ∗ ∗ ∗− + −   if he is hired by a screening 
principal, and 
1
2 2
nw e
∗
−   if hired by a non-screening principal. He prefers to work for a 
screening principal when  
1 1 1
2 2 2 2( )n nQ Q w w w m e∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗− ≥ − + −   holds. And this is indeed 
true: condition (2) implies 12 2 2( )w m e eα∗ ∗ = − <  ;  c nI w∗≥   implies  n nQ Q w w∗ ∗ ∗ ∗− ≥ −   
and hence  
1 1
2 2
n nQ Q w w∗ ∗∗ ∗− ≥ − , given that 
1 1
2 2
n nw w w w
∗ ∗∗ ∗
− ≥ −  holds for any 0.25w∗ ≥ . 
Though we do not have an analytical form for  c nI w
∗≥  , we can find a sufficient 
condition for it. The same cooperative type agent, if he works for a principal with perfect 
screening, gets income s s s nI w Q Q∗ ∗ ∗= + − . Since  sm m∗ ∗<   under (11) and 
2 2 2( )w m e α∗ ∗−= − , it is true that 2 2 2( )s sw w m e α∗ ∗ ∗−> = − . We also know sQ Q∗ ∗>   from 
the above proposition. Since s nI w
∗≥   holds when 
1
2
2
2
2
1s m
k kαρ
ρ
≤
−
 is true, it follows 
immediately that c s nI I w
∗> ≥   holds as well. 
 
